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Abstract
The Law of Deliberative Democracy, written by Ron Levy, a senior lecturer at the Australian National
University, and Graeme Orr, a professor of law at the University of Queensland, has broken critical new
ground in the practical application and expansion of deliberative democratic theory. The core concept for
deliberative democrats is that the exercise of political power is only legitimate when it is justified by
conversation and consensus with a broad range of citizens. With this book, Levy and Orr examine the degree
to which the laws of politics measure up with the ideals of deliberative democracy, as well as how and why
they should. In doing so, the authors ask an important question: To what extent does election law––the body
of laws regulating parties, candidates, voters, and other actors involved in representative elections––encourage
or inhibit deliberation, by the citizenry, about the mechanics of their democracy?
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The Law of Deliberative Democracy, by 
Ron Levy and Graeme Orr1
TANYA KUZMAN2
THE LAW OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, written by Ron Levy, a senior lecturer 
at the Australian National University, and Graeme Orr, a professor of law at 
the University of Queensland, has broken critical new ground in the practical 
application and expansion of deliberative democratic theory. The core concept 
for deliberative democrats is that the exercise of political power is only legitimate 
when it is justified by conversation and consensus with a broad range of citizens.3 
With this book, Levy and Orr examine the degree to which the laws of politics 
measure up with the ideals of deliberative democracy, as well as how and why 
they should. In doing so, the authors ask an important question: To what 
extent does election law––the body of laws regulating parties, candidates, 
voters, and other actors involved in representative elections––encourage or 
inhibit deliberation, by the citizenry, about the mechanics of their democracy? 
By analyzing deliberation from this perspective, Levy and Orr have skillfully 
bridged the disciplines of political science, political theory, and the law, carving 
1. (New York: Routledge, 2016).
2. Tanya Kuzman holds a JD from Osgoode Hall Law School. She attained her Master’s degree 
in Political Science from the University of Toronto and her undergraduate degree from 
McMaster University. 
3. See generally Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory 
of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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out a previously unexplored field of study that forces the reader to confront the 
law itself as an institution capable of bringing deliberative democracy to fruition. 
In part one, the authors begin by explaining the historical tension between 
governance seen as either deliberative, meaning inclusive, cooperative, reflective, 
and capable of generating intelligent law and public policy, or democratic, 
signifying the widespread participation of the citizenry in the creation and 
dispensation of law.4 Rarely, they explain, has governance been simultaneously 
seen as both deliberative and democratic. Through invoking the early work of 
Aristotle and J.S. Mill, the authors demonstrate the degree to which this divide is 
deeply entrenched in the work of political theorists, academics, and legal scholars.5 
Furthermore, the authors use part one to explore the intersection between law and 
politics. Levy and Orr shrewdly point out that judicialization and juridification of 
politics has led to extensive scholarship on how democratic institutions can shape 
deliberation to yield more trusted governance, but that the existing literature has 
generally failed to consider the law itself as an institution within the deliberative 
democratic landscape.6 This is a critical and novel aspect of the book. Existing 
deliberativists have focused on examining the legitimacy of laws by investigating 
the extent to which deliberation was a factor in their creation.7 What Levy and 
Orr focus on is the role of the law itself in determining the deliberative quality of 
democratic decision making.8 This gap in the discourse, coupled with the critical 
tension between visions of governance as either democratic or deliberative, forms 
the backdrop against which the authors’ arguments unfold. 
As the authors lay out the theory of deliberative democracy, the reader is 
given a proverbial tool box to be used in tackling the book’s remaining chapters.9 
In addition, the authors discuss the various rationales for pursuing deliberative 
democratic decision making, as well as the criticisms and ambiguities that still 
haunt the theory.10 This section is also used to orient the reader by discussing 
the sites of decision making in which the book’s analysis is focused, such as 
4. Levy & Orr, supra note 1 at 3-5.
5. Ibid. 
6. The judicialization of politics refers to an increasing reliance on the courts to address 
questions about public policy and political controversies. The juridification of politics refers 
to the proliferation of formal, rational legal systems in western societies. See generally Ran 
Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Politics” in Keith E Whittington, R Daniel Kelemen & 
Gregory A Caldeira, eds, Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008); Levy & Orr, supra note 1 at 5-6.
7. Levy & Orr, supra note 1 at 7-8.  
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid at 21-24. 
10. Ibid at 25-29.
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campaigning, voting, and deliberating in elections.11 What makes Levy and 
Orr’s book so captivating, however, is not just how skillfully they outline the 
conceptual theory of deliberative democracy, or the comprehensiveness of 
their justification for actively pursuing its grand normative goals, but rather, its 
ability to methodically dispel well-established critiques claiming that the law of 
politics is not consistent with deliberative democratic theory. For example, while 
deliberatively democratic decisions should emerge from systems that broadly 
survey the views of affected participants, judicial deliberation is practiced mainly 
in isolation, making it difficult to meet the theory’s democratic demands.12 Other 
critics have argued that entrenched partisan polarization makes achieving the 
theory’s hallmarks of cooperation and informed consent extremely challenging.13 
However, the authors rise to the challenge in responding to these critiques by 
unpacking what they feel are the true barriers to aligning the law of politics with 
deliberative democratic ideals.
Throughout the remainder of the book, Levy and Orr call the reader’s 
attention to the law of politics’ real deliberative problem, which is that of 
the design or practice of law, whereby courts favour methods that too often 
generate less deliberative reasoning. This is perhaps most apparent in the way 
judges use the principle of proportionality in legal reasoning. The fulcrum upon 
which the rest of the book pivots is Levy and Orr’s claim that proportionality 
often creates a false dichotomy between deliberation and the more dominant 
values of liberty, equality, and integrity in the law of politics (these three values, 
respectively, encompass the three remaining chapters of the book, exclusive of 
the conclusion).14 The authors substantiate these claims by looking at a range of 
case studies from regulating polling data to truth in political campaigns, public 
broadcasting of campaign pledges, and gerrymandering.15 Ultimately, Levy and 
Orr conclude that when judges adopt “thicker” readings of the values of liberty, 
equality, and integrity, they allow for a reconciliation with deliberation such that 
these values become mutually supportive rather than eclipsing one another.16 
They then examine the relationship between equality and the proposed value 
of deliberation. The authors explain that, when judges try to make decisions to 
either maintain or bring about political equality, they typically see the principle as 
11. Ibid at 25-36. 
12. Ibid at 45-46. See generally John Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of 
Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 1-21.
13. Levy & Orr, supra note 1 at 45-46.  
14. Ibid at 60-61.
15. Ibid at 86-108, 128-35, 149-81. 
16. Ibid at 60-61. 
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operating between competing political parties, political candidates, or individual 
voters themselves. However, Levy and Orr argue that this represents a “thin” 
conception of equality, one that unnecessarily casts deliberation as a value against 
which equality must be balanced. The case study focusing on the legal regulation 
of campaign speech proves insightful. Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth, the Australian High Court’s free expression case, concerned a 
law mandating publicly-funded broadcast airtime for political parties.17 The law 
granted free television airtime to candidates to deliver speeches about policy, 
untainted by visual distraction. The law also banned alternative forms of paid 
political broadcast advertising during campaigns. The court struck down the law, 
in part, because 90 per cent of the broadcast time was allocated for the parties 
already represented in parliament, with the remainder of time being allocated for 
parties without any incumbent members.18 Levy and Orr argue that, in doing 
so, the court mistakenly characterized the most pressing equality issue as being 
unequal division of time between established and developing parties.19 If left in 
place, the legislative scheme had the potential to realize significant deliberative 
goals, including an exchange of the typically short and shallow stump speeches 
for more substantive policy explanations. Therefore, Levy and Orr suggest, had 
the court been mindful of deliberation and equality, it would have upheld the law, 
possibly recommending modifications to rectify concerns about time allocation 
between the parties.20 With this case study, Levy and Orr demonstrate how the 
court’s “thin” view of equality underestimated the law’s broader deliberative 
potential by conceptualizing equality as a balance between political parties, rather 
than a gateway to more robust discussion of policy choices.21 
Finally, the authors deal with partisanship and the unethical use of power for 
political gain. Levy and Orr propose a “guidance” model for decision making, 
which they claim is capable of meeting deliberative goals, while avoiding at least 
some of the chronic coercion in democratic politics.22 The authors posit that the 
model helps to account for how, beginning in the early 1960s, the Federal Electoral 
Boundary Commissions rapidly eradicated a history of partisan gerrymandering 
in Canada.23 Levy and Orr use the concept of “thick” integrity to connote the 
17. Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth, [1992] HCA 45, 177 CLR 106; Levy 
& Orr, supra note 1 at 128-35.
18. Ibid at 128.
19. Ibid at 128-29
20. Ibid at 130.
21. Ibid at 129. 
22. Ibid at 164.
23. Ibid at 164-70.
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kind of decision making recommended by the model—that being well-sourced 
and reflective of relevant arguments rooted in rational methodologies.24 
Ultimately, the authors rightly point out that, while the law cannot compel 
behavior in keeping with “thick” integrity, embracing the guidance model can 
lead to decisions that have the capacity to entrench deliberation into the law, 
thereby ensuring more decisions are made with integrity.25 
The Law of Deliberative Democracy is an extremely well-written work which 
presents the reader with a novel lens through which to understand the role of the 
law as an institution capable of making deliberative democracy a reality. Levy 
and Orr’s prescriptions for adjustments to judicial reasoning chart a previously 
unmarked path to reconciliation between the values of liberty, equality, integrity, 
and deliberation. Their success is due, in large part, to the space and time they devote 
to explaining and re-explaining their arguments in engaging ways. For anyone 
intrigued by the discourse concerning the intersection between law, politics, and 
democracy, this book equips the reader with the conceptual tools to optimistically 
imagine and perhaps even work towards a truly deliberative democracy. 
24. Ibid at 60-61.
25. Ibid at 180-81. 
